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The European Citizens’ Initiative: Bringing the EU Closer to its Citizens?1 
 
Justin Greenwood2 
 
Abstract: In defiance of accounts which see the European Union (EU) as structurally 
incompatible with democracy, the Lisbon Treaty set out the general right and specific means 
for citizens to participate in EU decision-making.  Whilst the Treaty codified long-established 
practices of representative democracy and of dialogue with civil society organizations 
(CSOs), it also notably introduced a new measure, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), 
commencing in 2012.  The ECI has limited formal powers, with no ability to mandate 
political institutions. It is promoted by the European Commission as an agenda-setting and 
participatory democracy measure, rather than one of direct democracy.  Nonetheless, it has 
an elevated status within one of the current European Commission’s ten strategic priorities, 
and is remarkable in a number of ways.  First, it differs from the European Commission’s 
established partnerships and dialogue with organized interests by focusing on direct forms of 
wider citizen participation. Second, it is the world’s first transnational citizens’ initiative, 
with aspirations to help build an EU-wide public sphere.  These aspirations were assessed in 
a 2017 review of the measure, proposing the introduction of a number of reforms aimed at 
tackling limited impact to date.  This article evaluates the impact of the ECI in its first five 
years and then discusses the proposed reforms in terms of their potential to increase public 
deliberation.  It develops and appraises evaluative criteria that help to assess whether 
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institutionalizing contention, even in ways highly critical of EU institutions, might enhance 
public deliberation and bring the EU closer to its citizens. 
 
Keywords: European Citizens’ Initiative; Lisbon Treaty; Democracy; Political participation 
 
The European Commission Work Programme 2018 includes a pointed reference to the 
‘untapped potential of the Lisbon Treaty’ (European Commission, 2017a, p.3).  Article 
10(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) endows citizens with a general right to 
participate in the democratic life of the Union.  The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) 
(Article 11(4) TEU) has been promoted since its inception in 2012 as a key innovation of 
the Lisbon Treaty to help democratize the European Union (EU).  The ECI was greeted by 
commentators in deliberativist traditions as ‘one of the most important changes to EU 
governance processes made by the (Lisbon) Treaty’ (Eriksen and Fossum, in Warleigh-
Lack, 2007: 55).  The 2017 Commission proposal for a revision of the measure reflected 
that ‘[one] of the benefits of this instrument is … that it allows citizens to forge links with 
like-minded people across the Union, facilitating pan-European debates on issues that are 
close to citizens’ concerns and helping build an EU-wide public sphere’ (European 
Commission, 2017b). 
In its five year lifespan, 71 initiatives have been formally proposed of which 48 have 
been registered, involving the collection of 8 million signatures (European Commission, 
2017b), providing a legacy to evaluate the impact of the measure. An unofficial freestyle 
initiative also operated during this period, using the ECI wrapper (though not its clunky 
procedures) to collect a record 3.3 million signatures (STOP TTIP, 2018). As is discussed 
later, there is evidence that citizens’ initiatives have broadened EU agenda-setting, attracted 
new campaigners, and brought topics to new audiences.  Nonetheless, the key premise that 
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institutionalizing contention over EU issues will bring the EU closer to its citizens is a 
difficult yardstick to evaluate it by.  A related issue is whether ECI campaigns which are 
highly critical of the EU might ultimately offer a pathway to legitimizing the EU; it is 
difficult to imagine how populist Eurosceptic demands could have such an effect.   
The first institutional review of the ECI in 2017 reflects that ‘the instrument has not 
achieved its full potential’ (European Commission, 2017b, p.4) and records ‘limited debate 
and impact so far generated by citizens’ initiatives’ (ibid, p.5).  Commentators have pointed 
to key flaws in the design of the ECI, centred on its non-binding nature and the ability of the 
European Commission to dominate the instrument (Karatzia, 2017; Vogiatzis, 2017).  
Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that the ECI has political as well as institutional 
effects, a wider point about the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty covered by the 
introductory article and other contributions to this symposium (Hurrelmann and Baglioni, in 
this issue).  A key political effect is that the ECI broadens the EU ‘public space’, although the 
way it might do so is ill-defined.  What kind of public space does it broaden, and how?  At a 
moment when the European Commission has proposed reforms of the ECI hailed by key 
activist NGOs as ‘promising’ (ECAS, 2017), what contributions might these proposed 
reforms make to a broadened public space?  Is the broadened public space essentially a 
political space surrounding EU political institutions, or is it a broader arena of public debate? 
These questions are assessed in the analysis ahead by means of a section identifying the 
key features of the ECI, followed by a section that give an overview of the ECIs proposed in 
the mechanism’s first five years. Based on this overview, this article identifies and assesses 
three key effects of the ECI beyond legislative change.  This discussion is followed by an 
assessment of the impact which the new reforms of the ECI will have on these effects. 
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The ECI: Design and Reform 
The ECI is ‘a tool for participation and for agenda-setting at EU level’ (European 
Commission, 2017b, p.4).  ECIs carry no power to mandate EU institutions, but can request 
the European Commission to propose a legislative initiative.  In this latter respect, it has 
equivalence to powers vested in the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU 
(Karatzia, 2017); indeed, it is a design feature that the measure should not have powers which 
in any sense exceed those of the EP, given the primacy of representative democracy in the 
Treaties (Vogiatzis, 2017).  European Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans 
(who holds institutional responsibility for the ECI) very recently asserted in exchanges with 
the EP that the ECI is not an instrument of direct democracy (ECI Watch, December 2017).  
Rather, it is one of a number of instruments of participatory democracy used by the European 
Commission, alongside measures such as public consultations and its established dialogue 
with civil society organizations, and itemized in the TEU as Article 11 (in the preceding 
Constitutional Treaty form, referred to as the ‘participatory democracy’ article).  It involves a 
transnational campaigning process offering a mechanism of access to EU institutional 
deliberation for registered campaigns successful in acquiring, within a 12 month period, one 
million (verified) signatures from EU citizens from at least seven1 EU Member States2.  The 
organizing hosts of campaigns which reach this threshold have the opportunity to meet with 
the European Commission, and for their campaign demands to have a public hearing in the 
EP.  The European Commission must then elaborate upon and publish its reasons for 
choosing a particular course of action or inaction. 
An initiative must first be registered by the European Commission, requiring it to fulfil 
administrative and legal criteria, and, crucially, a test of admissibility.  That is, the initiative 
must fall within the competencies of the European Commission to act, as laid down in the 
Treaties and interpreted by the European Commission’s legal service.  Thirty per cent of 
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proposed initiatives have fallen at this hurdle, of which six have challenged the ruling before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), two successfully.3  Denied registration 
has been used by some campaigners as an attractive frame (‘the initiative they didn’t want 
you to sign’) for unofficial signature collection, and thus refused campaigns are considered in 
this analysis, alongside registered initiatives, in terms of their ability to agenda-set topics in 
political institutions, introduce contention, and public sphere effects.   
In sum, the ECI offers campaigners a means of institutionalized agenda-setting, 
strengthened by provision for a hearing in the EP and of which the European Commission 
takes account in making its response.  Given that the ECI appears to challenge the 
Commission’s right of initiative, some observers have wondered whether the Commission’s 
approach to it might be luke-warm (Nugent and Rhinard, 2016).  In reality, the Commission 
has tried hard to make the concept work because of its structural interests in deepening the 
European project and seeking popular legitimacy for it.  It has, since the early days of the 
ECI, lent its servers to campaigners because of the difficulties activists experienced in finding 
IT systems capable of complying with the requirements for data protection.  It has established 
an advice centre in the Europe Direct Contact Centre to answer directly questions from 
would-be organizers, including advice on the legal admissibility of envisaged initiatives.  
Almost all of the refused registrations, all on the grounds of legal eligibility, were in the first 
two years of the operation of the ECI.  Advice will be further strengthened by a new proposal 
to establish a dedicated online collaborative platform (European Commission, 2017b).  
One of the ten priorities of the Juncker Commission, ‘to increase democratic legitimacy 
in the EU through enhanced citizens’ involvement and participation’ (European Commission, 
2017b), which was prominently flagged in President Juncker’s State of the Union address in 
2017, is explicitly linked to the ECI in the Commission Legislative Work Programme of 
2018.  The Juncker Commission has taken a policy decision to elevate consideration of its 
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responses to successful (in meeting signature thresholds) ECIs to its highest decision-making 
tier, i.e., by the entire College of Commissioners.  The latest (February 2018) Commission 
proposals for revisions to the Drinking Water Directive make explicit reference to the first 
successful Citizens Initiative, Right2Water in a number of its provisions, while a recently 
successful ECI, Ban Glyphosate, has met with promises to increase the transparency and 
quality of studies the Commission uses in scientific assessments (December 2017).  From 
2017, the Commission is registering initiatives where only aspects fall within the scope of the 
Treaties for it to act, whereas previously the Commission treated partial eligibility as a reason 
for refusal.   All of these events have led to the initiative enjoying a period of renaissance, 
following a ‘doldrums’ period after its first two years of experimental use when a number of 
initiatives were refused registration on the grounds of eligibility. 
The ECI is the world’s first transnational citizens’ initiative mechanism.  Relative to 
citizens’ initiatives in national or regional jurisdictions, the ECI pales against the mandatory 
powers to be found in Switzerland and California (Allswang, 2000; Lutz, 2012; Smith and 
Tolbert, 2004), but shares with others (particularly in Europe – Qvortrup, 2012; Schiller and 
Setälä, 2012a; Schiller and Setälä, 2012b) a similar effect of agenda-setting (often lesser- 
known) issues from civil society, without enforcement powers.  In doing so, it offers 
something different from the EU’s established practices of dialogue with organized civil 
society as the best available proxy for an otherwise absent civil society.  These practices are 
commonly found among international organizations because of the ties they lack which 
would otherwise connect them with citizens, centred on the absence of a government in 
power.  The EU’s dialogue dates from shortly after the foundation of the European Economic 
Community in the 1950s.  There is an institutionalized social dialogue, giving representative 
employer organizations and trade unions special powers in employment related fields, as well 
as participation in a macro-economic dialogue.  There is also a mature dialogue between the 
7 
 
European Commission and eight different ‘families’ of NGOs, which has been stimulated by 
the European Commission and which involves a substantial program of funding of NGOs 
into professionalized advocacy organizations.  These dialogues are policy oriented, largely 
involving advocacy groups responding to legislative program set out by the European 
Commission in its annual Legislative Work Programme, in a dialogue with EU institutions 
inside the ‘Brussels bubble’.  Thus, the ECI, with its agenda-setting effects and opportunities 
for direct citizen participation, involves something quite new.  It received a mixed reaction 
from civil society organizations, some of whom perceived it as a threat to their established 
dialogue with EU institutions, although there has been some degree of acclimatization to it 
from them (Greenwood, 2015).  As is described later, the ECI has primarily mobilized a 
different set of activists from those working in professionalized NGOs in the ecosystem of 
organizations surrounding EU institutions in the ‘Brussels bubble.’ 
 
The ECI in Action 
Five of the forty signature collection campaigns completed to date have met the threshold: 
Water and Sanitation are a Human Right! Water is a Public Good, not a Commodity! 
(‘Right2Water’, aimed against water privatization); One of us (aimed at stopping embryonic 
stem cell research); Stop Vivisection; Ban Glyphosate and protect people and the 
environment from toxic pesticides; and Minority Safe Pack (a protection package for national 
minorities).4  The first of these to meet the threshold, Right2Water, got a thorough airing on 
German television, such that one half of a sample polled in Germany during the campaign 
claimed to have heard of the Initiative (Plottke, 2016).  A common denominator to all these 
campaigns involves the backing of established organizations – a key trade union 
(Right2Water: European Federation of Public Service Unions); social movements (One of us: 
Catholic Church; Stop Vivisection: Italian animal welfare organizations; Minority Safe Pack: 
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Federal Union of European Nationalities) or online campaigning NGOs (Ban glyphosate: 
WeMove.EU; Campact e.V.; Avaaz Foundation) – which reflects the extent of establishment 
required to meet the threshold.  By contrast, campaigns which have not met the threshold 
have frequently originated in newly formed organizational structures. 
Despite this apparent dependence of campaigns on established patrons, a key 
innovation of the ECI is a public transnational campaigning process leading to a formal 
mechanism of political access, and thus quite different from other EU practices of 
participation based around elite dialogue with interest representative organizations as an 
imperfect but best available proxy for civil society.  In reinforcement of this, Commissioner 
Maroš Šefčovič, the patron of the ECI in the European Commission at its outset, stressed that 
the ECI is ‘not for NGOs, but for all citizens’ (EurActiv, 2011).  Campaigns hosted by 
established advocacy organizations have been notably fewer than those emerging from 
freshly drawn campaign teams (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014; European Parliament 
Research Service, 2015).  It should also be noted that the measure has delivered fewer 
registration requests than the political patrons of the ECI first imagined, attributed to the 
bureaucratic and legal hurdles in the first years of its operation (Berg and Thomson, 2014).  
Apart from the requirement for the establishment of a Citizens’ Committee of seven 
individuals from seven different Member States, these (presently5) carry personal legal 
responsibility for the protection of data during the process of collecting signatures. 
In terms of a policy response, the European Commission refused point blank to meet 
any of the demands of One of Us (with little appetite from the EP to try to persuade the 
Commission otherwise).  Stop Vivisection met with statements of sympathy for the demands 
as long-term goals, but little by way of policy action.  Right2Water met with a partial (and 
continuing) policy response from the European Commission.  However, given its weak 
powers, the yardstick for success of the ECI lies not in its ability to achieve policy change, 
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but in other effects (European Commission, 2015; Bouza Garcia, 2015; Conrad, 2016).  It 
must be recognized that ECI campaigns have a range of motivations, including networking, 
positioning, and the creation/institutionalization of organizations (Pfafferot, 2013; Bouza 
Garcia and Greenwood, 2014).  Initiatives would also seem to have the power to: broaden the 
range of topics under consideration by political institutions; introduce contention to EU 
politics; and to create public discussion about them.   These aspects are considered in turn 
below, including the potential for development through the proposed reforms of the ECI. 
 
Three Evaluative Criteria for the ECI 
(1) Broadening the range of topics under consideration by political institutions: In terms of 
the first criterion, broadening policy agendas, examples of unconventional issues introduced 
to the EU political system include the following ECIs (® =refused registration, on 
interpretation by the Commission’s legal service that the proposal lies outside of the scope of 
the current EU Treaties for the Commission to act): 
• End Legalised Prostitution in Europe®; 
• End Ecocide in Europe (criminalization of the deliberate or reckless destruction of 
the natural environment)6; 
• Turn me Off (switching off lights in offices and shops at night); 
• Kündigung Personenfreizügigkeit Schweiz (end the Free Movement of People 
Agreement between the EU and Switzerland); 
• Let me Vote (full voting rights for cross-border EU citizens in adopted state); 
• An end to front companies; 
• European Free Vaping Initiative (take vaping products outside the scope of 
regulation as a tobacco or medicinal product); 
• Weed Like to Talk (legalize Cannabis); 
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• 30km/hour – making the streets liveable (urban and village speed limit); 
• Suspension of the EU Climate & Energy Package; 
• Pour une gestion responsible des déchets contre les incinérateurs (for responsible 
waste management, against incinerators); 
• Unconditional Basic Income7; 
• One of Us (stop embryo stem cell research); 
• Retaining European Citizenship (for cross-border citizens affected by Brexit); 
• Sing the European Anthem in Esperanto8. 
• We are a welcoming Europe, let us help (including immunity from prosecution for 
those offering humanitarian assistance to migrants). 
Initiatives proposing ‘lesser known’ issues are an ideal means of agenda-setting, whereas 
mainstream issues are championed by established NGOs with more conventional ways of 
pursuing their cause than an ECI. New campaigns have predominated the applications for 
ECI registration (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014).  For ECIs without an established 
patron or ready access to networks of supporters, there seems limited prospects to achieve the 
one million signature threshold.  For these campaigns, the Petitions Committee (PETI) of the 
EP has signalled its willingness to treat those under the signature threshold in the same way 
as it would give consideration to an ordinary citizen petition, with the ability to recommend 
that the EP uses its powers to request the European Commission to bring forward a legislative 
initiative, i.e., with similar effect to that of a successful ECI (Vogiatzis, 2017). 
A striking feature of ECI campaigns to date involves the disproportionately strong 
presence among Citizens’ Committees of the 21-30 age cohort, whose share constitutes 
around twice that of each of the next nearest groups, 31-40 and 41-50 (European Parliament 
Research Service, 2015; see also Gherghina and Groh, 2016).  This group are well placed to 
broaden agendas under consideration by political institutions.  Many ECIs have the feel about 
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them of student, or post-student, politics.   The ECI concept is likely to carry disproportionate 
appeal among student groups relative to other segments of civil society, with its opportunities 
for experimentation and adventure, transnational fellowship, public campaigning, deployment 
of discourse, communication and e-skills.  Universities have a highly diverse range of 
nationalities among their student cohort, making it easy to form a Citizens’ Committee, and 
students who have been on an Erasmus exchange are particularly likely to want to experiment 
with what Europe can offer.9  Whilst this group will undoubtedly broaden agenda-setting, the 
earlier era of experimentation seems to have passed, judging by the more mainstream nature 
of topics addressed by initiatives open for signature in 2017, such as questions related to EU 
citizenship and economic differentials within the EU. 
Another dimension to agenda-setting breadth is introduced by Oleart and Bouza (2017), 
who identify how issues have been taken up by campaigns not obviously European in their 
essence, such as media pluralism and stop water privatization.  These commentators 
emphasize the way in which such campaigns have claimed the ‘European’ frame for the 
issues they pursue.  Similarly, Duer and Mateo (2014) have shown how the climate of public 
opinion influences decisions by producer actors on whether to lobby EU institutions, with 
matters of high salience deterring business lobbying.  Even the arena of expert lobbying is 
subject to the wider climate of contentious politics. 
 
(2) Contentious Politics: The Laeken Declaration preceding the Lisbon Treaty expressed an 
explicit aspiration that contention over issues in EU politics would help to ‘bring the EU 
closer to its citizens’ (Hurrelmann and Baglioni, in this issue).  A number of the exemplars of 
broadening agenda-setting also serve as examples of contentious politics, meaning that 
initiatives go against the grain of EU public policy.  Bouza Garcia and Greenwood (2014) 
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undertook an analysis of 60 signature campaigns,10 and rated 25 as contentious.  Prominent 
among these are initiatives whose registration was (at least initially) refused: 
• A Europe of Solidarity (cancel Greek debt); ®  
• STOP TTIP! (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership); ® 
• Minority Safe Pack (protection for national minorities); ® 
• My Voice Against Nuclear Power; ®  
• Strengthening citizens’ participation in decisions on collective sovereignty 
(Catalan independence); ® 
• Stop Brexit; ® 
• British friends – stay with us in the EU. ® 
Three of the above campaigns (A Europe of Solidarity, Minority Safe Pack, STOP TTIP!) 
continued their crusade with challenges (in the latter two cases, successfully11) to the refusal 
decision before the CJEU. However, STOP TTIP! is the only one of the above list to have 
commenced as an ECI campaign and to have remained prominent in EU wide public 
discussion.  
Bouza Garcia and Greenwood (2014) found that consensual campaigns were more 
likely to be associated with movers already well linked to EU politics, whereas outsiders 
were more likely to introduce topics which challenged the direction of travel of EU public 
policy.  Among the registered campaigns were two with clearly Eurosceptic demands, 
Abolish the European Parliament, and Confidence Vote on EU Government.  It seems a 
stretch to suggest that such topics might somehow be a pathway to bring the EU closer to its 
citizens.  ECIs can be registered provided, inter alia, they would not undermine fundamental 
human rights, the rule of law, or democracy.  Three of the four successful signature collection 
campaigns took issue with the direction of specific EU policy initiatives, to varying degrees.  
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One of Us is the most clear-cut case, in that it challenged EU funding of embryonic stem cell 
research, and the European Commission refused outright to meet any of the demands of the 
initiative after taking stock of the positions of the co-legislators (Karatzia, 2017).  Stop 
Vivisection! wanted an almost immediate ban on animal testing, whereas current EU 
legislation foresees a lengthy tapered period or reduced usage.  Similarly, the Ban Glyphosate 
ECI joins some Member States in seeking an end to the licence for the use of the most 
common global weed killer, for which the European Commission won approval for a 5 year 
extension in 2017.  The response of the European Commission to two cases resulted in 
(unsuccessful) complaints by the organizers, with One of Us taking a case before the CJEU 
and Stop Vivisection taking a complaint to the European Ombudsman.  These three 
contentious ECIs all experienced public counter-mobilization by producer interests (Bouza 
Garcia and Greenwood, 2014; Karatzia, 2017), joined in some cases by Member States.  As 
with contentious politics more generally, these have attracted the interest of the media (see, 
for instance, Marks and Paravacini, 2017), and create more public discussion than subjects 
which follow the broad direction of travel of EU policy initiatives, which are largely 
unchallenged by organized interests or Member States. 
 
(3) Creating Public Discussion: The STOP TTIP! campaign seems to have been energized 
by its refused registration as an ECI, using the frame of rejection as a means to attract a 
substantial number of petition signatures.  The campaign website presents itself as ‘an 
alliance of more than 500 civil society organizations and trade unions from all over 
Europe’ (STOP TTIP, 2018) and makes reference to campaign demonstrations gathering 
25,000 individuals in a number of European cities including a concentrated focus of 
protest events in far flung venues across Romania (ibid).  For public sphere impact, there 
are a variety of noteworthy features of the campaign (De Ville and Siles-Brugge, 2015), 
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including responsiveness of EU institutions to demands for transparency of negotiations, 
and politicization of the hitherto obscure Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS) 
mechanism to the point that it became a key sticking point in transatlantic negotiations.  
The example is significant, because the regulatory emphasis of EU competencies and 
correspondingly technical character of much EU legislation is a core difficulty in making 
issues amenable to public discussion, as any cursory glance at the list of topics/files open 
on the Europa online consultation portal would confirm.  The STOP-TTIP! campaign 
seems to have broken through this barrier by presenting a rather technical issue in an 
amenable form for public discussion, and in doing so bringing a high degree of contention 
to public spheres.  Conrad refers to the STOP TTIP! initiative as an example of an issue 
which ‘can lead to a conflict-induced awakening of the European public sphere’ (Conrad, 
2016, p.76).   A qualification is that the initiative’s success in mobilising opposition 
against TTIP had relatively little to do with its origins as an ECI, other than to frame the 
initiative as something the EU Commission did not want people to sign. 
 
It should be emphasised that creating public discussion does not by itself lead to 
the creation of contentious politics.  There are plenty of initiatives which have made 
relatively straightforward demands on political institutions which bear no claim to contest 
the broad direction of policy travel, but rather to add policy provision.  Examples include 
initiatives calling for a plain for sustainable development and employment, and initiatives 
aimed at at strengthening exchange programmes or the recognition of European 
qualifications. 
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The ECI’s impact on democracy  
The consequence of these criteria involves the potential for democratization, in 
which a key ingredient is held to be public contestation. As Follesdal (2015, p.261) has put 
it, ‘[in] a well-functioning democracy, rival[s] present and defend competing policy 
positions based on a contested conception of the European interest’, and on such a basis 
we find ‘evidence [that] European public spheres indeed exist’. The centrality of 
contestation for democratization at EU level emerges further in debates about a political 
public sphere. Authors such as Kohler Koch (2012) and Crespy (2014) have expressed 
scepticism about the democratic effects of a system of ‘participatory governance’ 
established at EU level which is based around opportunities for professionalized civil 
society organizations to contribute to EU policy-making through a series of procedures for 
participation.  For both authors, such forms of participation are quite different from a 
genuine system of participatory democracy that would bring about ‘the democratic 
empowerment of citizens and … equal and effective participation’ (Kohler Koch, 2012, 
p.820).  Whilst Kohler Koch focuses more on the structural weaknesses of participatory 
governance procedures, both focus on the limited range of professionalized advocacy 
organizations which participate in them.  Crespy strikes a more optimistic note, focusing 
more on ‘bridging’ organizations, notably trade unions and the wider social movements in 
which they are embedded, linking contestation to and from civil society with the 
proceduralized Brussels arena of technical policy-making.  Contestation is similarly 
central to public spheres in the account provided by van de Steeg (2010,p.39), who argues 
that ‘public spheres emerge through the public debate of controversial issues’ and points 
out that, ‘[t]he more we debate issues, the more we engage each other in our public 
discourses, the more we actually create political communities’.  
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These considerations raise the question as to whether the ECI is best captured as (1) a 
wider European public sphere; (2) a narrower European political public sphere involving 
contestation and campaigning for political resolution; or in different terms as (3) a ‘polity 
activating device [as part of a] polity under constitution’ (Saward, 2013, pp.228-236).  Van 
de Steeg takes forward this latter notion of the public sphere as a polity, in which ‘the 
political community from which the public debate emanates is the point of departure’ (Van de 
Steeg, 2010, p.32). Such a political community is formed of ‘a collection of common spaces 
or fora in which citizens can publicly exchange ideas, opinions and information on problems 
they encounter while living together in the same polity’ (ibid, p.39). 
In line with the first conception – a European public sphere – is a claim by Conrad 
(2016, p.65) who refers to the Right2Water campaign as the ‘remarkable awakening of a 
transnational public sphere’.  Some direct democracy campaigners estimate that it takes five 
conversations to convert into one signature.12  The process of campaigning therefore offers at 
least the prospect of a political public sphere, i.e., public discussion on political issues.  This 
offers an intriguing prospect, because the ECI results in citizens in different Member States 
discussing the same issues simultaneously.  It also offers the opportunity to ‘download’ 
European issues into national arenas.   The Right2Water campaign left a legacy for 
campaigners against the introduction of water charges in Ireland, framing a national 
campaign within the explicit demands and symbols of a European campaign.  Protesters on 
rallies were spotted waving Greek flags, in a sign of solidarity with the fiscal crisis there 
(Greenwood and Tuokko, 2016). 
The legal framework of the ECI is at least set up for a transnational political public 
sphere.  The registration of an initiative requires the establishment of a Citizens’ Committee, 
comprising seven citizens from seven different Member States.  Contestable frames and 
issues are necessarily presented in the process of campaigning and seeking signatures of 
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support, albeit to varying degrees.  The requirement for signatures to be obtained from at 
least seven different Member States demands the translation of campaign materials for 
initiatives.  Campaigns are therefore available in the language of national publics.  Eriksen (in 
Conrad, 2016, p.77) raises the prospect that ‘the democratic function ... can very well be 
performed by segmented and/or Europeanized national public spheres’, in which 
‘simultaneous transnationalisation and renationalisation of debate about contentious issues is 
consistent with the understanding of Europeanized national spheres as the functional 
equivalent of one overarching European public sphere’ (ibid, p.70). 
Together, these factors raise the possibility of a transnational political public sphere, 
and a more permissive basis than those accounts which render the EU as inherently 
unsuitable for democracy due to its status as an international organization primarily 
concerned with technical regulation (Kohler Koch, 2012). Jügen Habermas (1995; 2001) has 
addressed the question of a European political public sphere in a number of short 
contributions.  Whilst much of the focus of these involves the need for a constitution for 
Europe, he has identified how there could be ‘a political public sphere which enables citizens 
to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance’ (Habermas 1995, 
p.306). For Habermas, this would be constituted from the ‘flowing contents of a circulatory 
process that is generated through the legal institutionalisation of citizens’ communication’ 
(ibid, p.306).   
The ECI is therefore a close fit with the conditions established by Habermas for the 
establishment of a political public sphere.  It is a mechanism in which the stabilization and 
legitimization of the discourse takes place through some kind of institutionalization in the 
form of a ‘space’ with specific rules and procedures of interaction’ (Knaut, 2016, p.58).  The 
effect of this political communication is politicization, which is ‘about political conflict and 
the intensification of political debates in the public spheres’ (Risse, 2015a, p. 14), in which 
18 
 
the latter plural is intended to convey recognition of debates about Europe, in particular, in a 
plurality of territorial contexts (local, national, transnational) (Risse, 2015a; 2015b).    
The design concept of the ECI follows a key criterion presented by Risse for the 
Europeanization of public spheres in which ‘fellow Europeans are present in the various 
national and issue-specific public spheres as both speakers and audiences’ (Risse, 2015a, 
p.10).  Greenwood and Tuokko (2017) assessed ECIs which continued as campaigns in other 
formats despite failing to reach the threshold of one million signatures in the ECI registration 
period of 12 months. Among such campaigns, celebrity endorsement from fellow Europeans 
was a key feature in the momentum of STOP TTIP!, Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) and 
End Ecocide campaigns,13 after which a spike in signature collection was quickly visible to 
campaigners.  This was a feature of a number of campaigns in Bulgaria, in particular 
(Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017), where a number of ECIs (Education is an Investment; End 
Ecocide; European Initiative for Media Pluralism; Fraternité 2020; My Voice Against 
Nuclear Power; UBI) reported unexpectedly high levels of support, and the signature 
threshold was almost reached for the Stop Vivisection campaign.  A mixture of national 
campaigning, and cross-border campaign support, lead to a notable number of successes for 
campaigns.  The UBI campaign in Bulgaria resulted in the highest signature collection tally 
for the initiative across the EU-28 after Germany and France, with a multiple of 2.5 of the 
quota required.14  The campaign was also boosted by the involvement of Bulgarian trade 
unions,  support from domestic NGOs and acts of entrepreneurship from active campaign 
supporters.  A new initiative, Let us reduce the wage and economic differences that tear the 
EU apart, is directly designed to appeal to audiences in Central and East European countries.  
Substantial success in collecting signatures elsewhere in Central and Eastern European 
countries has been noted, in Croatia (UBI; STOP-TTIP!), Estonia (End Ecocide in Europe), 
Hungary (STOP-TTIP! Minority Safe Pack) and Romania (Single Communication Tariff Act; 
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Minority Safe Pack, related to ending cross-border data use charges), followed significant 
television and radio coverage in particular, due to nationally organized campaigns 
(Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017).  Notably, the Bulgarian mobilization follows a pattern in 
which trade unions provide a key bridge between the spheres of public contestation and EU 
politics, in which conflict plays a central role (Crespy, 2014). 
Greenwood and Tuokko (2017) judged ten ECI related campaigns to have continuing 
(i.e., beyond their period of registration as an ECI) medium- to high-profile public campaigns 
offering a contested conception of the European interest, and which carried features of the 
formation of political public spheres across national boundaries.  Of these, three were ‘new’ 
ECI campaigns in terms of both subject and origin, End Ecocide in Europe, European Free 
Vaping, and Unconditional Basic Income, and which had run the course as full signature 
collection campaigns (Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017).   
 
Further reforming the ECI 
In its 2017 legislative reform proposal15 for the ECI, the Commission has put forward a 
comprehensive range of measures aimed at making the ECI work better.  These have their 
origin in the generic Better Regulation program applied by the Commission to propose 
reform of existing regulatory measures, using its comprehensive REFIT (Regulatory Fitness 
and Performance) evaluative tool.  Reform measures proposed include harmonizing the age 
for eligibility to sign an initiative to 16 years, currently only applicable in Austria.  Other 
measures involve the establishment of a centralized online system to facilitate signature 
collection, and which would offer campaigners the opportunity of further related functions 
such as the ability to communicate with supporters during the course of campaigns.  The 
Commission is now proposing to undertake itself the translation of every registered initiative 
into the 24 working languages of the EU.  A guiding principle has been to reduce the burden 
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on organizers and supporters proportionate to the nature of the ECI as having no binding 
effect (European Commission, 2017b).  The data requirements for the verification of 
signatures has been streamlined, making it easier for campaigners to administer and for 
supporters to sign initiatives.  There is a new help facility to provide campaigners with 
preliminary legal advice on the formulation and admissibility of possible initiatives.  And the 
Commission has proposed a change to the starting trigger for the 12 month signature 
collection period, giving campaigners a much longer time period in comparison to the 
present.  The proposals also place obligations on campaigners for public interest effects.  
There are opportunities built in to the process for further public deliberation, through 
improved reasoning given in cases where registration is refused, an increase in the time 
period for the Commission to prepare its response to allow for consultation of other EU 
institutions and of stakeholders, and the involvement of a wider range of public stakeholders 
in the hearings of the EP. 
The reform measures proposed will clearly make it easier for campaigners and would-
be signatories alike, such that an increase in the flow of campaigns can reasonably be 
expected to at least maintain the diversity of topics introduced to the EU policy agenda.  
These are likely to continue to offer topics which challenge EU public policy agendas to 
varying degrees, and public debate will follow an increase in campaigning activity.  The 
easier entry thresholds for campaigners are likely to lead to an increase in ‘outsider’ 
organizations using the mechanism, which in turn is likely to lead to an increase in contention 
orientated ECIs.  These seem likely to go beyond the expansion of an EU political space, into 
a broader public space. 
Karatzia (2017) focuses on ways in which institutionalized mechanisms can deliver 
further public deliberation.  These range from the inclusion of a deliberative platform for all 
ECIs to allow website visitors to comment on ECI proposals, to mechanisms designed to 
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draw the Council (which was conspicuously absent from ECI hearings) in to ECI debates 
(European Ombudsman, 2017; Karatzia, 2017).  Given, for instance, the entrenched divisions 
between Member States over the contentious topic of banning glyphosate, the ECI could be a 
bridge between public and institutionalized debate.  Both the Ombudsman and the CJEU have 
commented on the need for the Commission to expand its reasoning in all stages of the ECI, 
and in particular for the political choices it makes (European Ombudsman, 2017; Vogiatzis, 
2017).  This is one of the few areas where stakeholder NGOs have expressed dissatisfaction 
with the Commission reform proposals, with little by way of new proposals in the 2017 
reform package (ECAS, 2017).  Both the Ombudsman, and the CJEU, have urged the 
Commission to elaborate on its reasoning where it refuses registration, both to enable public 
understanding and to allow campaigners to react accordingly (European Ombudsman, 2017).  
Core ECI activists are currently focusing on mechanisms aimed at strengthening the 
implementation of demands made (ECI Watch, 2017).  The European Ombudsman has been 
a key source of reform proposals for reform of the ECI.  A key idea aimed at improving 
public deliberation is her proposal that the Commission should gauge the possible support by 
the Council and the EP before devising its response to an ECI, with their responses ‘seen as 
an opportunity for a wider debate, thereby strengthening the European public sphere and 
democracy at EU level’ (Vogiatzis, 2017, p.264).  A related idea is for the Commission to 
formally transmit the ECI to the EP and Council for an institutional response to its 
Communication, with the effect of institutionalizing debate and contention. 
 
Conclusion 
The ECI was promoted as a key innovation to boost the democratic features of the EU, but in 
an ill-defined way.  The five-year point since its inception offers a good moment to evaluate 
it.  There have been fewer campaigns than its patrons in the European Commission imagined, 
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but nonetheless the registration proposals to date clearly reveal that the ECI has had the effect 
of broadening the EU policy agenda.  It is designed for transnational campaigning, has 
enthused a young audience, and brought new campaigners to EU politics well beyond the 
reach of the traditional ‘Brussels bubble’ in which more or less institutionalized NGOs 
satellite EU institutions.  They have used social media and other means to bring topics 
institutionalized as official EU campaigns to audiences throughout the Member States, with a 
notable reach beyond the ‘usual suspects’ into central and east European countries.  These 
campaigners have undoubtedly broadened the range of topics under consideration by political 
institutions.  Six campaigns (including STOP TTIP!) have exceeded the one million signature 
threshold, all of which have carried significant contention, offering ‘competing policy 
positions based on a contested conception of the European interest’ (Follesdal, 2015, p.261).  
Most of these campaigns resulted in counter-mobilization by producer interests, drawing 
them into public communication.  The successful campaigns have brought institutionalized 
mechanisms of deliberation, while other campaigns have brought public discussion of issues, 
often providing novel EU frames, with no small degree of contention.  Nonetheless, the jury 
is still out on whether institutionalizing contention over EU issues will bring the EU closer to 
its citizens, while a greater stretch of imagination is required to see how contentious politics 
with a critical EU character is ultimately likely to lead to legitimation of the EU. 
There seems to be plenty of supporters for the idea that there is a transnational public 
sphere, albeit of segmented national publics.  How the ECI addresses these is significant, 
because it fulfils the Habermasian criteria of citizens from different countries discussing the 
same topics of the same relevance at the same time, with a legal institutionalization of 
citizens’ communication.  A transnational public sphere seems ill-defined, but the policy 
orientation of the ECI offers a pathway to greater precision as a transnational political public 
sphere, in which contentious politics is clearly present, and in which contention is 
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institutionalized over EU issues.  There remain legislative issues which have attracted 
European-wide public contention (see, for instance, the account given by Dür and Mateo, 
2014, involving public mobilization over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ACTA), 
and in which the ECI has not featured.  But the ECI has provided an institutionalized 
opportunity for contention, with political effects. 
 
1 Before Brexit, this was intended to be a watermark of one-quarter of EU Member States. 
2 Signature thresholds per country are weighted in relation to the size of populations.   
3 Successful challenges were launched by Minority Safe Pack (Case T646/13) and STOP TTIP! (Case T754/14), 
both now registered in modified format. 
4 At the time of writing, signatures for this campaign have yet to be verified. Following this, there would be a 
policy response from the European Commission, a hearing in the EP and a meeting with the ECI organizers. 
5 The new reform proposals remove this liability by the establishment of a new legal structure for the host 
committees of campaigns. 
6 This initiative was first version refused registration, then registered in revised format. 
7 This initiative was initially refused registration, later registered in modified format. 
8 This was not, as some initial coverage assumed, a prank, but a proposal originating from within the European 
Esperanto Association. 
9 Some of the ECIs which appeared at an early stage of the measure have been registered as part of coursework 
on a Masters course in European integration, at Sciences-Po Paris. 
10 These include ‘pilot’ unofficial campaigns run in the period immediately before the ECI commenced. 
11 Both campaigns were subsequently registered as ECIs; Minority Safe Pack involved registration of those parts 
of the demands which were held by the CJEU to fall within the jurisdiction of the Treaties (Case T-646/13). 
12 Conversation with Carsten Berg, now at the ECI Campaign. 
13 For instance, celebrity chef Jamie Oliver endorsed STOP TTIP! (‘I really don’t want beef with growth 
hormones, nor chicken washed with chlorine … and I certainly don’t want our farmers undermined’, STOP 
TTIP!, 2018), and fashion designer Vivienne Westwood supported End Ecocide (End Ecocide, 2018).  
14 Email exchange with Klaus Sambor, UBI Campaign Committee, 5 February 2014. 32,006 signatures were 
obtained by the UBI campaign in Bulgaria. 
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15 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European citizens’ initiative, 
COM2017 482 final. 
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